originating in Tanzania, this study seeks to advance our understanding of how prices are formed along supply chains that span multiple national boundaries and their implications for value distribution along chains and the extent to, and ways in which, unequal North-South economic relations are reproduced or challenged.
Tanzania is particularly fascinating case study for a number of reasons. Coffee is an important income source for the economy as a whole as well as for individual producers and their families. Despite accounting for less than 1% of gross domestic product in 2010 (International Coffee Organization [ICO] 2015a), the coffee sector averages US$ 100 million in export earnings per annum, and over 2.4 million individuals in Tanzania depend on coffee for their livelihoods in some way (Tanzania Coffee Board 2012) . Coffee marketing and trade have undergone numerous changes, permitting an investigation of multiple marketing systems in parallel and allowing for an examination of the relational dynamics between and in new and old institutional structures. In Tanzania, coffee is produced in the north around the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro (predominantly Arabica coffee) and in the south (predominantly Robusta coffee). This study focuses on the production of Arabica coffee in the Kilimanjaro region. The position of Kilimanjaro's coffee producers as price takers in the international coffee market allows us to investigate price relationships originating at the global level down to the local level in the field.
This study brings together in-depth research of how actual prices come into existence on the ground and how prices are formed and transmitted by different actors in Tanzania and at the level of domestic and international trade. The institutional aspects we consider as loci of such global-local links include the cooperative unions and appended institutions such as EG_ Bargawi 6 village primary societies. 4 We will also consider the roles of the central coffee auction and the New York derivatives markets in forming and transmitting prices along the chain.
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses approaches to the theory of price formation from mainstream economics, contemporary economic sociology, and economic geography before sketching out in the section that follows this study's approach to the study of price formation in spatially separated but connected markets along commodity supply chains. The third section presents the results from this investigation of price formation along the price chain from coffee futures markets to the farm-gate in the Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania. The penultimate section provides a discussion on the development implications of pricing mechanisms and modalities in coffee markets today and a calls for more detailed investigations of how real-world markets operate, and more detailed studies of processes of price formation for other commodities and in other countries. The final section provides conclusions on price formation and development.
Approaches to the Study of Markets and Price Formation along Commodity Chains
This section presents the various ways in which the state of the art has analyzed and dealt with prices in commodity markets. Three differing approaches are presented from very different scholarly and methodological origins. The three approaches can be classified as (1) the mainstream economics approach, (2) chain and network approaches, and (3) the institutional approach. By discussing these different approaches and their attempts at the study of prices in commodity markets, it will become clear where this particular study is able to fill gaps by crossing the currently distinct boundaries of theory and method. 4 Primary societies are voluntary groupings of coffee farmers, based around their village or locality and are aimed at assisting producers with the production and marketing of their coffee. These societies were originally introduced as a central part of the cooperative marketing system. Today, however, the functions and membership numbers of primary societies in Tanzania are not uniform.
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Mainstream Economic Approaches to Prices along Commodity Chains
At the core to mainstream economic approaches to the study of prices is the neoclassical theory of price determination where price results from the coming together of supply (as the aggregation of individual firms' output informed by the dictum of profit maximization) and demand (as the aggregation of individuals' demand determined by given and static preferences) through market competition. Given the critical coordinating function of prices as providing "crucial points of orientation for actors in market exchange that make heterogeneous objects and services commensurable" (Beckert 2011, 759) and the centrality of market exchange in mainstream economics, it follows that the translation of theory into both policy practice and empirical research on supply chains focus exclusively on market integration in order to unleash the forces of economic restructuring according to the comparative advantage of each country, and price transmission, respectively. If unabated by market imperfections, competitive markets are understood to guarantee an efficient allocation of resources and in turn implies that factor and product prices in spatially separated markets will differ only by transport and storage costs. Given that the definition of market integration implied by the standard spatial equilibrium model links directly to price outcomes, cointegration analysis-the times series econometrics method that allows the investigation of long-run equilibrium statistical relationships between variables-has become the most prominent analytical tool employed in empirical studies on market integration. In addition, co-integration analysis and its associated error correction models are presumed to allow the researcher to test certain features such as completeness, speed, and asymmetries in the relationship between prices. Here, focus has been on the extent and statistical nature of price transmission along supply chains (e.g., Abdulai 2000; Krivonos 2004; Rapsomanikis, Hallam, and Conforti 2006; Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao 2010) . EG_ Bargawi 8 While error correction models may provide forecasts for spot price developments in the near and medium term, they present a number of analytical, and technical, limitations that prevent their legitimate use as a model of price formation in commodity markets. First, this abstract view of markets disembedded from their institutional contexts and social, cultural, and political processes that make up real-world interactions constituting a market and shaping market outcomes can tell us little about the mechanisms by which prices are formed or the role that they play in processes of production and exchange. Second, the mainstream economic approach is unable to explain spatial variations in prices except in terms of market imperfections and lack of market integration that divorce localized supply and demand dynamics from regional or global market conditions. Third, greater price pass-through from world markets to prices received by primary producers in and of themselves cannot be taken as supportive of development processes. Fourth, supply and demand models conceive of markets as horizontal supply and demand relations and neglect the vertical structure of commodity supply chains. The above concerns with the mainstream economic approaches are highlighted by the theoretical approach discussed below and in Figure 1 , where the standard economic approach takes into account column B only.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Chain and Network Approaches to Price Formation and Transmission
Born out of a critique of disembeddedness of mainstream economics' market abstraction, network approaches to the study of markets (and price formation) emerged from economic sociology and focused on the social embeddedness of economic action, namely, as "embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than being carried out by atomized actors" (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992, 9 ) Network approaches to the study of price formation thus investigates power, trust, and status differentiation as mechanisms EG_ Bargawi 9 through which networks, and network position, become relevant for market prices (Beckert 2011 ).
In network approaches, price is the outcome of how relationships are structured in the market field and how network position influences costs with power, trust, and status differences between actors as key factors in the formation of price (ibid.). Furthermore, pricebased competition along supply chains and the ways in which differentiated chain actors are able to create spaces for price negotiation and organizational forms to shield them from pricebased competition remain critical for development outcomes and therefore deserve greater attention than is currently afforded in chain studies (Ouma 2012) .
While network or relational approaches to the study of markets have been prevalent in recent economic geography literatures, there has been very little attention on price formation in networked markets. In relation to agrofood chains, Ouma (ibid.) adopts a relationalconstructionist approach that draws heavily from relational approaches while emphasizing certain insights from the marketization approach, namely, the necessity of studying materialities of market making (discussed below). A firm's survival is dependent on achieving relational stability: stable "socio-material relations vis-à-vis worker, suppliers, buyers, consumers, and the state" (Ouma 2012, 323) . While not focussing on processes of price formation, Ouma (2012) showed how the maintenance of relational stability was key to shielding certain actors from price competition, on the one hand, and how price competition can destroy and undermine relational stability in the case of Tongo Fruits (a Ghanaian agrobusiness firm specialising in the cutting and packing of fruits fresh from harvest in the country of origin), on the other hand.
Rather than a clear break from network approaches of new economic sociology, marketization, as a subset, or one modality, of economization, retains much of the language and analytical devices of network theorists while orientating the focus of study on to EG_ Bargawi 10 materialities: "the socio-technical assemblages and things that circulate from hand to hand" (Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 384 To date, the application of network and marketization approaches to the study of markets has left in the background, how networks and agencies, and therefore economic Sunley calls for an analytical approach that set connections and relations "within an EG_ Bargawi 12 evolutional and historic institutionalism and understand how forms of economic relations are inseparable from other institutional practices and institutional positions" (2008, 19) .
By employing an analytical approach discussed below and outlined in Figure 1 , this study hopes to deepen existing network approaches by both discussing price formation and transmission at the very top and bottom of the price chain but also by bringing in the macroinstitutional factors that have a tendency to be left in the background of most chain and network approaches.
Institutions and Price Formation
In spite of its historic significance in economic sociology, for example, in the work of Durkheim (1947 Durkheim ( , 1992 , Weber (1978), and Polanyi (1992) , there has been little work on the influence of institutional regulation on economic outcomes, including prices, since the first half of the twentieth century (Beckert 2011) . On the one hand, specific institutions matter in their impact on prices, and, on the other hand, mechanisms and processes of price formation are themselves underpinned by institutions that do not emerge spontaneously. This includes the flexible price mechanism. According to Polanyi (1992) , "Acts of exchange on the personal level produce prices only if they occur under a system of price-making markets, an institutional setup which is nowhere created by mere random acts of exchange" (Polanyi 1992, 36) . The regulation of markets is itself a part of the price struggle among actors who try to influence the market situation of commodities, "which in turn is determined either by tradition, convention, law or voluntary action arising from the interest of actors in the field" (Beckert 2011, 767 ).
Beckert (2011) identifies five mechanisms and instruments through which institutional rules impact on prices. First, regulation that directly alters the supply on markets or influence product costs, such as regulation on competition, quality standards, minimum wages, regulation of rights of unions to organize, and intellectual property rights, all alter the EG_ Bargawi 13 nature of competition, the distribution of market power, and hence the distribution of value across different actors. In this way the "market price" "emerges not so much from market forces as from institutional structures." (ibid., 769) Second, regulations on the externalization of costs, such as environmental standards and labor safety laws, increase private production costs and hence prices. Third, regulatory institutions, such as warranties and other forms of consumer protection policies aimed at reducing uncertainties associated with informational asymmetries, will affect prices. Fourth, taxation and subsidies used by political actors to provide incentives or disincentives for the production or purchase of a specific good will affect prices. Finally, monetary policies that affect the availability and price of credit affect price levels.
Each of the approaches discussed above provides valuable insights into the constitution and operation of real-life markets and price formation. They show us that competition is regulated via institutional rules that affect distributional outcomes and are therefore contested between market participants. Market participants can exert their agency differentially depending on their position in networks and exercising of prominent technical devices and instruments of price calculation. Networks as relational configurations are created, stabilized, or dissolved in processes of contestation and are important explanatory factors. However, neither network relations, nor the materialities of market making and exchange should be privileged over institutions that differ in terms of their duration and path dependency. Nor should institutions be viewed as fixed, since they are themselves political and social entities shaped in part through networked relations. The next section details the analytical framework developed for this study, which integrates such an appreciation of institutions into the study of price formation and transmission.
EG_ Bargawi 14
An Analytical Framework for a Study of Price Formation and Transmission in Commodity Chains
The analytical framework adopted for this study of coffee prices is motivated by the discussion above. Different strands of social science research have analyzed and evaluated the formation of prices, the transmission of prices, and the impact of prices and price changes to differing degrees and on different actors. However, by dealing in isolation with a particular issue from a particular standpoint, factors impacting on prices, beyond the particular analytical framework adopted, have frequently been lost. For example, network and marketization approaches have been motivated by a desire to study markets and economic activities from the ground up in response to critiques of highly abstract supply and demand framework of economic orthodoxy and the tendency toward top-down theorizing in political economy. The result has been a preoccupation with the micro in empirical studies to the frequent neglect of the macro (Callon 1998; Granovetter 2002; Fine 2005; Sunley 2008; Berndt and Boeckler 2012; Ouma 2012 ).
Moving forward, we advocate a synthetic approach that adheres to the following points: (1) it is cognizant of an appropriate linking between micro and macro in their coconstitution; (2) it does not, a priori, prioritize market structure, networks and relational stability, institutions or technical devices, but rather analyzes how these different processes interact dynamically and differentially across commodities, spaces, and time, under different macroeconomic conditions, the changing character of global capital accumulation and capitalist restructuring; (3) it permits the analysis of points in the price chains as well as the extreme ends of the chain, without assuming that the actors or institutions that make up these points in the chain are in any way homogeneous or act in the same way in response to external influences. EG_ Bargawi 15 Our analytical framework begins with a stylized price chain (see section B in Figure   1 ). Other chain and network approaches to the study of markets have historically proceeded by following the thing, the commodity as it is transformed from primary to consumer product with the identification of specific processes or nodes that serve as links in the chain. With greater recognition that the production and marketing of a good involves complex webs of interconnected intra-and extrachain networks, network approaches have advocated a method of following the actors beyond the physical commodity chain (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002; Henderson et al. 2002) . Methodologically, this becomes problematic, since the researcher has to make an arbitrary choice in demarcating the network of study from the multitudes of network to which it is connected and embedded.
We therefore advocate an approach that follows the price chain that complements other chain and network approaches to the study of markets. The framing of a price chain, following the processes of price formation along commodity chains, allows the researcher to systematically select both intra-and extrachain sites and activities of study, connecting the macro and micro, the global and the local. Formation" above. However, the missing link from these institutional assessments is a broader chain approach. Instead, studies have focused on the role of a particular institutional arrangement in, for example, stabilizing or maintaining prices at a single price point. As such, this study sheds light on how and why these institutional aspects matter, not just for the formation of prices at one particular point, but also for the transmission of prices between points.
Segment C of Figure 1 helps illustrate the importance of recent network and marketization approaches to understanding prices, among other things. These relational factors highlight how social processes are at the root of understanding relationships, including those of price transmission. Despite this crucial addition, most studies are unable to complete the vertical price chain using such an approach. Instead they tend to focus on the relationship between two points in the chain, analyzing in depth the relations between actors and therefore prices as an outcome of such relationships.
In this study, the price chain acts as a starting point, allowing us to frame our empirical research of the real-life processes of price formation in a contemporary coffee marketing system: the ways in which they are anchored in institutional regulation and the social structure of markets, and the nature of contestation, including the technical and relational apparatus deployed.
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Studying Price Transmission along Tanzanian Coffee Chains: Outlining
Context, Methods, and Applying the Analytical Framework
Given the proposed approach, this study is necessarily grounded in reality and compels us to adopt a case study approach in order to uncover the aspects of price formation and transmission currently inadequately explained by the literature. This section provides a contextual and analytical framework for this study, by setting out the major themes that underpin it. First, the local context in Kilimanjaro will be described, tracing the evolution of institutional changes and the historic role of coffee in the local economy. This section will also briefly discuss coffee as an international commodity and the changes that have occurred at the global level. Finally, this section provides details and justification of our concrete case study methods.
Kilimanjaro Coffee
Coffee has been traded since the sixteenth century and is produced in over one hundred countries along the equatorial belt. Coffee production is, in many parts of the world, linked to the colonial history, from German and British colonial rule in East Africa to Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in Latin America. The importance of coffee production to numerous low income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,() cannot be understated. In fact, over 90% of coffee production originates in the south, indicating the importance of understanding its role in growth and development (Ponte 2001 (Ponte , 2002 . The wide geographic spread of coffee production, from Latin America to SSA and increasingly East Asia has resulted in intense competition among producers, leading to further price pressures (Maizels, Bacon, and Mavrotas 1997 ). Tanzania's coffee is exported to a number of countries, with Germany, Japan, and Italy making up the majority of this demand. The importance of Tanzania as an international coffee producer is negligible, at around 0.7% of world output EG_ Bargawi 18 over the last twenty years (ICO 2015b). However, Tanzanian coffee is a particularly important substitute producer for other producers of mild Arabica and Robusta coffee.
Tanzanian coffee is therefore often sought by importers and roasters for these substitute characteristics in the creation of blends (Daviron and Ponte 2006) .
Arabica coffee is also a historic central income source for agricultural producers in the Kilimanjaro region. Coffee production was introduced by German Roman Catholic missionaries in the late 1890s and was initially restricted to settler plantations in favorable planting areas surrounding Mount Kilimanjaro. Despite opposition from the settlers and plantation owners, coffee cultivation among Chagga peasant cultivators grew (Iliffe 1979) . In part, the growth of coffee production among peasant producers can be traced to the ease of interplanting, especially among existing banana groves but also due to the successful establishment of one of the first agricultural producer cooperatives, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA). The KNPA allowed producers to act as one voice against the perceived exploitation by Asian and European middlemen as well as continued lobbying against peasant coffee production by European plantation owners (Kimario 1992) . Through the KNPA and later the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), producers could also begin to address crop disease problems and attempt to access necessary chemicals and spraying equipment (Iliffe 1979) . Following independence in 1961, the newly formed Tanzanian government implemented drastic policies in the agricultural sector. These included frequent and varied changes to the role of agricultural cooperatives ending with liberalization of the domestic and international trade of coffee in the early 1990s (Ponte 2002 (Ponte , 2004 . One central aspect that has been largely retained in the Tanzanian case (unlike its East African coffee-trading neighbors) is the central coffee auction, which was first introduced in 1952 to make the domestically processed coffee available to the international export market. Figure 2 provides a stylized picture of an Arabica coffee commodity chain that originates in EG_ Bargawi 19 Tanzania's Kilimanjaro region.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Method and Fieldwork Description
We adopt a case study approach, considering Tanzanian Consequently, our analysis both goes beyond the physical commodity chain to include derivatives markets and key institutions, and extends current thinking at the extreme ends of the commodity chain.
We conducted a series of semistructured interviews with commodity traders, key personnel in all of the largest international coffee trading houses in the United States, London, and Switzerland. In Tanzania 
The Tanzanian Coffee Price Chain Reexamined: From World Prices to
Farm-gates
The notion of a world price plays a core role in coffee price formation on the ground.
As a commodity where supply and demand are largely located in different parts of the world, the world price is generally understood as reflecting the global supply and demand for coffee.
As already discussed above, far from the mainstream economic abstract supply and demand depiction of markets, markets-including the notional world market-are regulated through varying institutional configurations. Changes in the regulation of the world market for coffee EG_ Bargawi 21 have also changed the index, or price prosthesis in the lexicon employed by Çalişkan (2010) that actors consider as the world price.
The collapse of the system of target price (or price band) and adjustable export quotas That's the first thing you look at, New York and London . . . And a differential against the market. On a commercial grade it will be a description, let's say Colombia Excelsior, that grade will sell for between level money (which means the same price on New York) to plus 2, plus 2.5. It won't fluctuate far from that band, fob. And so when we're buying we try and buy at level money and when we're selling we try to sell at plus 2 and that's our 2 cent margin, and if we can make 2 cents we're a very happy trade house. On that sort of commercial grade, that's the sort of business it is. And if people aren't selling at level money then we are not buying, pretty much as simple as that.
Trade in bulk grades are conducted by larger traders. The margins on such trades are small, and trading companies derive their incomes from dealing in very large volumes, usually supplying the largest multinational coffee roasting companies and sourcing from around the world on a continuous basis.
International trading companies purchase coffee from local exporters, subsidiaries, or companies in their trading group located at origin. For coffee from a particular origin, the international trader decides on a differential to the international exchange at which it is willing to purchase coffee on that day. This differential reflects the difference in quality of the contracted coffee compared with minimum quality deliverable on either of the international exchanges. The trader then contacts its suppliers with this offer price, and the negotiation proceeds based on local market conditions. It is up to the seller to decide to fix the price at a particular time. The actual price at which the coffee is exchanged will be the EG_ Bargawi 25 futures price at the point of fixing, plus or minus the agreed differential under the so-called price-to-be-fixed contract. Since the international trader hedges by offsetting its position in physicals with futures contracts, the time at which the price is fixed is of little importance. On the other hand, local exporters tend not to be hedged so the time at which they fix can be critical. A seller may hold off fixing the price if it expects the futures price to rise further; losses are made if the futures price falls below the price at which coffee was purchased.
The large roasting companies do not purchase commercial grades of coffee on a continuous basis but will be in the market at a particular time for a particular grade. For example, a roaster will enter the market at some point in order to secure the Central American coffees that are needed for the following three to twelve months. The roasting company will make the trading companies aware of their needs and invite offers from the various traders.
Once again the contract price will be based on a differential of the relevant international exchange but with the buyer's option to fix. The price at which physical coffee of commercial grades is bought and sold in international trade is inextricably linked to the price of coffee futures contracts on the New York and London exchanges.
The wholesale use of price-to-be-fixed contracts in the bulk coffee trade at the international trader level cements the relationship between the physical and the futures markets for coffee. The use of these contracts, as opposed to fixed-price forward contractswhere the price, volume, and delivery date are determined at the time of signing-means that the volatile prices on international exchanges are transmitted more rapidly and fully into the prices at which physical coffee is traded. This has implications on the way in which futures prices are transmitted from international exchanges, via international traders, upstream along individual coffee chains toward the production end of the chain. As another coffee trader observed, EG_ Bargawi 26 [T]he futures price is the determinant all along the chain. It feeds right down through because at any point on any given day there is not going to be anyone who is able to put a price that is drastically much higher or lower than anyone who is basing themselves on the futures market. . . . This is not so much in the speciality market but in the trading in the bulk commodities, it is very much the futures market.
Moreover, international traders have increasingly integrated futures trading into their accumulation strategies. There is evidence that commodity trading houses engage in speculative hedging in order to reap financial rewards in addition to the management of price risks in the context of increasingly volatile commodity prices (Newman 2009a ).
There is also greater alignment of multinational corporations'(MNC)trading strategies with those of financial investors. Physical traders look not only at fundamentals but also try to anticipate the factors that determine financial investors' trading decisions. As one trader interviewed by UNCTAD (2011, 44) put it, "the banks are trying to understand our markets and we try to understand their markets." This has had profound implications on the distribution of price risks along coffee chains and the ability of different chain actors to profit from financialized accumulation (Newman 2009a ).
The Tanzania Coffee Auction and Domestic Trading Price(s) for Coffee
In terms of domestic price formation, the Tanzanian coffee marketing system, with its parallel cooperative and private marketing channels, and the existence of a central auction, reveals some interesting complexities (see Figure 2) .
Leaving, the direct export channels (on the right-hand side of Figure 2 ) to one side, there are four main channels through which smallholder coffee is marketed locally. First (marked 1 in Figure 2 ), the purely private marketing channel consists of private coffee buyers (PCBs) purchasing parchment at the farm-gate or at local buying posts. The PCBs deliver the parchment coffee to the dry mills for processing at a fee. The coffee is then stored, awaiting EG_ Bargawi 27 the next auction. While the ownership of the coffee is transferred to the parchment buyer in the private marketing chains, ownership of the coffee remains with the farmers until the auction in the three remaining marketing channels.
Secondly (marked 3 in Figure 2 ), the traditional cooperative channel is still in operation in the Kilimanjaro region. Farmers deposit coffee at the primary society where it is inspected and weighed. The farmer is given a first payment for the coffee. The collected parchment is transported to the union-owned mill and processed. Once the coffee has been auctioned, the farmers receive a second payment for the difference between the auction price and the first payment, with costs deducted.
The remaining two marketing channels (marked 2 and 4 in Figure 2 ) utilize elements of the cooperative marketing system. A number of primary societies have left the unions to which they once belonged and have formed alliances with other farmers' groups to market their coffee. Here, cooperation between the groups is for marketing purposes only (marked 2 in Figure 2 ). The final, and most recently introduced, marketing channel is coordinated by producer support organizations for direct export, which we will not discuss in detail here (marked 4 in Figure 2 ).
11
There are two channels by which coffee is exported from Tanzania, via auction and through direct export. The vast majority of coffee exports go through the coffee auction (between 60 and 90% over the past ten years, although this can vary dramatically from year to year according to Baregu, Barreiro-Hurle, and Maro (2013) , where exporters purchase graded and bagged green coffee. Here we focus on the auction system as the mediator of price transmission for the majority of coffee exports from Tanzania. For a number of commentators, "the auction appears to be an efficient pricing mechanism, in the sense that 11 These are largely funded by external donors, and the organizations deliver programs and services aimed at developing the smallholder coffee sector in Tanzania. The projects seek to improve the quality of smallholder coffee and market it externally as speciality coffee.
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realized prices move in accordance with the New York Board of Trade futures prices" (Baffes 2005, 35) .
Licensed buyers at the coffee auction include private export companies (dominated by subsidiaries of MNC trading companies) and cooperative unions. For the bulk grades of coffee, the decision for exporters to purchase coffee at the auction will depend on the sales that have been secured and their need to secure coffee to fulfill forward contracts. Since these sales will be made at a differential on a price-to-be-fixed contract, the New York and London prices determine the price at which the exporter will purchase bulk grades at the auction. Two of the four MNC exporters interviewed operated as the buying arms for their groups. Coffee sales to roasters are made through the European offices, and the exporter based in Tanzania is issued with shipping instructions for these sales.
The process of purchasing and exporting speciality grades differs from that for bulk grades. Exporters are less likely to sell specialty coffee on contracts that are far forward.
Overseas buyers of speciality quality tend to procure coffee on the basis of a sample of the coffee that the exporter already has in stock. Speciality coffee exporters, including the cooperative union exporters, have closer and more direct ties with their markets. These exporters will have a good idea of what their customers are looking for and purchase coffee on the auction accordingly. The pricing of speciality coffees also differs from the bulk.
Speciality coffees tend to sell on a large positive differential to New York. This differential is realized on the basis of a sample through analysis and cupping by the exporter and his client.
Coffee that is destined for the gourmet market may be priced with no consideration for the New York price.
In the 2010-2011 crop year, 60% of mild Arabica coffee sold at auction was made up of the premium and speciality (AA, A, and PB) grades. Since the pricing of these coffees can be less dependent on New York, it might be expected that swings in prices on the New York EG_ Bargawi 29 market will not be as fully reflected in the auction prices. This would explain the findings by Krivonos (2004) that there was a slight reduction in the degree of price transmission between world and local coffee prices in Tanzania. In contrast to Krivonos's own interpretation of this finding as a result of the incomplete nature of the coffee market reforms in Tanzania, the weakening in the co-integration relationship between world and local coffee prices can be interpreted as the consequence of the Tanzania Coffee Board's strategy to differentiate green coffee at the auction and market speciality grades where prices are realized differently.
The auction system in Tanzania has certain other attributes and performs important functions in terms of price transmission and price stabilization that are often overlooked.
Since 2001 
Farm-gate Prices for Coffee in Kilimanjaro Region
While the coffee auction discussed above performs an important role in terms of information provision and price stabilization, auction prices do not necessarily reflect the prices received by producers (see Figure 2) . The continued economic viability and functioning of the cooperative unions in most regions has allowed these to provide producers with a more stable producer price. Producers in the Kilimanjaro region who sell to KNCU, therefore, face more stable prices than those selling to private companies. This is due to the EG_ Bargawi 30 KNCU's payment system, which offers producers the opportunity to sell their crops early but still retain the potential to benefit from increases in price once the crop has been sold to exporters through the auction. Most coffee producers in the Kilimanjaro region have completed harvesting and selling their coffee by December, and relative gains from price increases will evidently depend on seasonal price developments (however, the general tendency has been for prices to increase over the season). Furthermore, prices in the region in which KNCU operates are unified across geographic areas. Producers who choose to sell their coffee to private companies at village buying posts are unable to benefit from this additional payment system and instead receive a one-off, location-dependent price.
In general therefore, producers selling outside the cooperative system are more exposed to unexpected price shifts. However, other factors are also important in determining outcomes for producers, including the price of coffee relative to the price of other goods and services, including food. As Figure 3 shows, in nominal terms, producer prices initially Wanri and Narumu villages, on the other hand, displayed a particularly negative view of price developments over recent years.
The above considerations suggest that coffee producers in the Kilimanjaro region have been exposed to considerable real price erosion since the mid-1990s, although the exact impacts have been diverse. When international and export prices have fallen, producers have borne the brunt of the impact in both real and nominal terms. When prices have risen, EG_ Bargawi 32 producers in general have, however, not benefitted proportionally, largely due to the concurrent increases in the cost of inputs and food. 12 Given the earlier discussion regarding the role of the auction in Tanzania, one can speculate that a counterfactual situation in which no auction system exists would expose Tanzanian coffee producers even further to the above problems. The results also suggest that producers marketing their coffee via the local cooperative union are better protected from price falls than those selling to private traders.
Conclusion: Price Formation and Development
This article has examined the nature of price formation and transmission in the Tanzanian coffee price chain. It has investigated how prices are formed in different segments of the chain and how they are transmitted between different segments of the price chain, down to the level of Tanzanian coffee farmers. The article presented a new framework for the study of prices that has helped to demonstrate how prices, are in reality, formed and transmitted. By bringing together relational and institutional perspectives to bear on existing approaches, the article develops the field of chain studies. Economic geographers have only recently begun to expand their field of enquiry into prices, price formation, and pricing behavior. This has been a vast improvement on the historic and socially detached theories of price transmission conducted by mainstream economists. While the research among economic geographers on prices is to be commended, some gaps remain. This becomes evident when price is put at the center of the analysis, as in this study. Rather than focusing on particular relationships or specific institutions as a starting point, this study tackles prices and price transmission as a vehicle through which to understand how the global is transmitted 12 Consumer prices for inputs and food have risen for a number of reasons in Tanzania. One can associate the price increases with changes in global prices from the mid-2000s to 2013, particularly the increase in the oil price, which has fed into the costs of production (Ghosh 2010) . The rise in input prices is also a result of changes to the domestic sale and pricing, with liberalization resulting in fewer subsidized inputs available to producers (Bargawi 2015) . EG_ Bargawi 33 to the local. In particular, our focus on the processes of price formation, their institutional embeddedness, and their social-spatial dynamics sheds new light on both the nature of the networked relations in commodity systems as well as their implications for the geographic distribution value and (uneven) economic development. This framework is not unique to the study of coffee in Tanzania. Instead it is hoped that other researchers are able to borrow from this new analytical framework and apply it in other contexts and to other commodities to similarly gain greater insights into real price formation and transmission and, ultimately, development.
In the context of coffee and Tanzania, three main points can be drawn from our analysis. First, there has been a dislocation between movements in coffee futures prices and changes in physical supply and demand conditions, owing to increased financialization and the rise of commodities as an asset class in portfolio investment. Second, the way in which prices are transmitted from the world level to coffee producers depends crucially on the structure of the domestic marketing system. The auction system in Tanzania has cushioned the transmission of daily international price movements to domestic traders and cooperative unions. Finally, these domestic institutional changes have led to a differentiation in price transmission and impact. In the Kilimanjaro region, producers linked to the KNCU cooperative system are generally more protected from in-season price changes. While producers selling to private agents are more exposed to price shifts.
Given the findings of this research, it is important to assess the implications for economic development in Tanzania, particularly since prices have become the locus of a great deal of policy attention. Increasingly, this has come in the form of research on price instability and attempts to rectify such volatility via the use of risk-management mechanisms by commodity producers on the ground. This article has demonstrated the limits of such a policy focus. Instead, the allied forces of domestic institutional change and international price EG_ Bargawi 34 formation need to be appreciated in order to understand how prices are transmitted to producers. Figure 1 . An institutional and relational framework for assessing commodity price. 
